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Abstract
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)’s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium
theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.
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1 Introduction
The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (sQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)
is one of the most popular theories for the analysis of data from laboratory experiments
(Goeree et al., 2016). This theory differs from the basic Nash equilibrium theory in which
it assumes that there are separable unobservable perturbations to agents’ payoffs, which
induce agents to behave as if they were noisy best responders.
sQRE theory has been subject to criticism. If its unobservables are unrestricted in the
domain in which they are defined, for each possible distribution on observables there are
unobservables that generate it (Haile et al., 2008). As a response to this, Goeree et al.
(2005) proposed two solutions. The first is to discipline sQRE with an a priori property of
behavior for which there is empirical support, payoff monotonicity. This property requires
frequencies of play of each agent to be ordinally equivalent with expected utility. The second
is to replace the structure of unobservables in this theory with a reduced form noisy best
response, which also guarantees payoff monotonicity, the regular QRE (rQRE) theory.
∗Thanks to the audience at UT Austin Theory seminar for useful comments. All errors are our own.
†rvelezca@tamu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rodrigoavelezswebpage/home
‡alexbrown@tamu.edu; http://people.tamu.edu/∼alexbrown
1
Goeree et al. (2005) argue that the separability of perturbations in sQRE induces re-
strictions on behavior that may not be plausible when comparing behavior across games.
Because of this they advocate rQRE in these situations. They do not have conclusive rec-
ommendations for the analysis of data from games in which unobservables are plausible to
be comparable. For instance, for different experimental sessions with the same payoff func-
tion when subjects come from the same population. Indeed, they pose as an open question
whether in this situation payoff monotone sQRE and rQRE have the same empirical content
(Sec. 6.1., Goeree et al., 2005).
Haile et al. (2008)’s criticism of sQRE and Goeree et al. (2005)’s response to it epitomize
the conflict between falsifiability and specification of a theory. We submit that when facing
this trade off, one can gain a better understanding of the problem by comparing the empirical
content of a falsifiable theory with the “bare” empirical content of the a priori restrictions
used to make the model falsifiable. That is, one should check whether all behavior satisfying
these a priori restrictions can be generated by the falsifiable model. If this is so, one is sure
that as long as these restrictions are supported by data, the model is well specified (under
the implicit hypothesis that the structure of the unobservables is the correct one). If this
is not so, either one should be able to confirm that empirical data can be characterized by
stronger properties, or the model may be misspecified and its structure of unobservables
needs to be revised.
This paper advances this study for sQRE when restricted by payoff monotonicity. We
show that whenever at least an agent has at least three actions available, there can be
payoff monotone distributions of observables that cannot be generated by any sQRE model
consistent with payoff monotonicity (Theorem 1). This paradoxical situation is actually not
resolved if one also disciplines this theory with proximity to Nash behavior. That is, for a
given action space in which at least an agent has at least three actions available, one can
always construct a payoff matrix for which the union of the range of all payoff monotone
sQRE models excludes an open ball centered in a Nash equilibrium that is the limit of
payoff monotone behavior (Theorem 2).
All in all, our results alert researchers in experimental economics about the possible
misspecification of monotone sQRE in situations in which there was no evidence of any
issues with this theory. As a byproduct, we answer Goeree et al. (2005)’s standing question
about the relationship of the empirical content of monotone sQRE and rQRE. Since a
Nash equilibrium that can be approximated by payoff monotone behavior can always be
approximated by rQRE (Velez and Brown, 2019), Theorem 2 implies that the game-wise
empirical content of monotone sQRE and rQRE may differ when at least an agent has at
least three actions available.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sec. 2 introduces definitions. Sec. 3
presents our results. Sec. 4 concludes and details the relationship of our work with that
of Goeree et al. (2005) and Haile et al. (2008); discusses the implications of our results for
the related randomly disturbed payoffs models of Harsanyi (1973); and finally discusses the
relevance of our results for the refinement of Nash equilibrium.
2 Definitions
2.1 Falsifiability and specification of a theory
Our primitive is a set of random variables whose realizations are observable and of interest
to a researcher. Let O be the set of all joint distributions of observable random variables. A
theory is an abstraction that the researcher creates describing the relationship between the
joint distribution of a set of unobservable random variables that the researcher introduces
in the analysis and the joint distribution of observable random variables. Formally, a theory
is a pair (U,S) where U is a set of joint distributions of unobservable random variables and
S is a correspondence µ ∈ U 7→ S(µ) ⊆ O. A model of theory (U,S) is a pair (µ,S(µ))
where µ ∈ U. The interpretation is that given the joint distribution on unobservable
random variables is µ, the theory determines that the joint distribution of observable random
variables is necessarily in S(µ). Whenever convenient we describe a theory by the collection
of its models. A phenomenon is a set of joint distributions on observables P ⊆ O. A theory
is well-specified for the study of P if for each ρ ∈ P there is µ ∈ U such that ρ ∈ S(µ). A
theory is consistent with P if for each µ ∈ U, S(U) ⊆ P. A theory is falsifiable if S(U) ( O.1
2.2 Observable Nash equilibrium
Consider a set of agents N ≡ {1, ..., n} and a finite set of available actions to each agent, Ai.
Let A ≡ A1 × · · · × An. Since we will not make any statement about environments with
different set of agents and actions, let us fix N and A. To avoid trivialities we assume that
there are at least two agents with at least two actions available. For each u ∈ RN×A let
Γ(u) ≡ (N,A, u) be the corresponding normal form game.
A strategy for agent i is a probability distribution on Ai, denoted by σi ∈ ∆(Ai). A pure
1Our definitions essentially follow Chambers et al. (2014). We differ in that we explicitly define a theory
as relating random distributions of unobservables and observables in the tradition in economics that assumes
that even though the researchers are able to observe only finite data, when this data is powerful enough
they can determine with some level of confidence whether distributions on observables belong to a particular
family of distributions (e.g. Athey and Haile, 2007). Thus, our notion of falsification should be understood
as the existence of finite sets from which a researcher can conclude with a reasonable level of confidence that
the distribution that generated the data does not belong to the distributions generated by the theory.
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strategy places probability one on a given action. A strategy is interior if it places positive
probability on each possible action. A profile of strategies is denoted by σ ≡ (σi)i∈N ∈ ∆ ≡
∆(A1) × · · · ×∆(An). Given S ⊆ N , we denote a subprofile of strategies for these agents
by σS . When S = N \ {i}, we simply write σ−i ∈ ∆−i ≡ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj). Consistently,
we concatenate partial strategy profiles as in (σ−i, µi). We consistently use this convention
when operating with vectors.
We assume that both u and σ are observable. This is reasonable in laboratory ex-
periments. This is also a valuable thought experiment that has been used to provide a
foundation to Nash equilibrium theory (Harsanyi, 1973).
We denote agent i’s expected utility given strategy profile σ by Uui(σ). We write
Uui(σ−i, ai) for the utility that agent i gets from playing action ai when the other agents
play σ−i. A Nash equilibrium of Γ(u) is a profile of strategies σ such that for each i ∈ N
and each σ′i ∈ ∆(Ai), Uui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ−i, σ
′
i) (Nash, 1951). We denote this set by N(Γ(u)).
2.3 Structural QRE theory
Nash equilibrium theory, i.e., the one that associates with a trivial distribution of unob-
servables the set of all degenerate outcomes {(u, σ) : u ∈ RN×A, σ ∈ N(Γ(u))}, is easily
falsified. Because of this, researchers have modified this theory in order to account for a
meaningful effect of unobservables. There are multiple ways in which this can be done. One
can assume that the researcher imperfectly observes payoffs, that the agent is not a perfect
utility maximizer, that the agent is not an expected utility maximizer, and so on. The
structural QRE theory of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which we introduce next, allows
the researcher to articulate the first two of these ideas while retaining the expected utility
hypothesis.
For each i ∈ N let Bi be the set of Borel probability measures on R
Ai that are absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and B ≡ B1 × · · · × Bn.
2 For each µ ≡
(µi)i∈N ∈ B, let (Γ(u), µ) be the incomplete information game with independent common
prior µ ≡ µ1 × · · · × µn where payoffs are determined as follows. Given type xi ∈ R
Ai for
agent i, her expected utility index is a ∈ A 7→ ui(a) + xi(ai). The interpretation of these
perturbations is that the agent fails to perfectly recognize the difference of expected payoffs
between the actions and correctly maximize (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) or that there are
unobserved shocks to expected utility of actions.
2We do not assume perturbations have full support as McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Because of this
our sQRE models do not necessarily satisfy interiority and strictly contain McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)’s
sQRE models. Besides allowing us to present slightly more general results, this allows us to easily extend our
analysis to Harsanyi (1973)’s randomly disturbed payoff models as defined in a general form by Govindan
et al. (2003).
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Absolute continuity of perturbations allows the researcher to associate, based on the
expected utility maximization hypothesis, a unique observable behavior to agent i, almost
every µi, as a response to a distribution of play of the other agents. More precisely, consider
i ∈ N and suppose that µi ∈ Bi. One can easily see that for each σ−i ∈ ∆−i and for µi
almost every realization of the perturbation, say xi, there is a unique maximizer of
ai ∈ Ai 7→
∑
a−i
(ui(a−i, ai) + xi(ai))σ−i(a−i) = Uui(σ−i, ai) + xi(ai). (1)
Thus, given µi and σ−i, the probability with which agent i is observed playing a given action
is uniquely defined under the hypothesis of expected utility maximization. Let
Bui,µii (σ−i) ≡ (B
ui,µi
iai
(σ−i))ai∈Ai ∈ ∆(Ai),
be this distribution. It is easy to see that this function is continuous and that the fixed
points of σ ∈ ∆ 7→ (Bui,µii (σ−i))i∈N ∈ ∆, which exist by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,
are the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of (Γ(u), µ), which we denote by BNE(Γ(u), µ)
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
Note from (1) that the best response operator depends only on the vector of expected
utilities (Uui(σ−i, ai))ai∈Ai . Thus, a best response operator is characterized by the function
x ∈ RAi 7→ Qµii (x), where
σ−i ∈ ∆−i 7→ B
ui,µi
i (σ−i) = Q
µi
i (Uui(σ−i, ·)) ∈ ∆(A−i).
The function Qµ ≡ (Qµii )i∈N only depends on N , A, and µ, and does not depend on u. It
is usually referred to as a structural Quantal Response Function (sQRF) (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995; Goeree et al., 2005). The sQRF most commonly used in empirical analysis
of experimental data is the Logistic form, lλi , which is associated with the so-called double-
exponential i.i.d. perturbation (Goeree et al., 2018), and, for λi ∈ [0,+∞), assigns to each
ai ∈ Ai and each x ∈ R
Ai the value,
lλiiai(x) ≡
eλixai
∑
aˆi∈Ai
eλixaˆi
. (2)
Definition 1. The structural QRE (sQRE) theory is the pair (B,N ) where for each µ ∈ B,
N (µ) is the set of all (u, σ) with u ∈ RN×A and σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ).
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Player 1
a1 a2 a3
Player 2 b1 100, 100 100, 100 100, 100
b2 0, 101 0, 102 0, 104
Table 1: Game Γ(u∗).
3 Results
In an effort to construct an econometric model based on sQRE, Haile et al. (2008) study a
particular ΨHHK ⊆ B that includes all perturbations that exhibit certain form of correla-
tion. These authors show that (ΨHHK ,N ) is not falsifiable, i.e., for each (u, σ) ∈ R
N×A×∆
there is µ ∈ ΨHHK such that σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ). Thus, (B,N ) is not falsifiable.
Falsifiability is arguably a defining characteristic of scientific theories (Popper, 1968).
Thus, Haile et al. (2008)’s result showed the need to discipline sQRE. As a response to this,
Goeree et al. (2005) proposed to require consistency of sQRE with an observable property
of behavior that was always implicitly assumed in empirical applications of these models.
Definition 2. Let u ∈ RN×A and σ ≡ (σi) ∈ ∆. (u, σ) is payoff monotone if for each
i ∈ N , σi is ordinally equivalent with (Uui(σ−i, ai))ai∈Ai . We denote the set of (u, σ) that
are payoff monotone by M. When (u, σ) ∈M, we say that σ is payoff monotone for u.
Intuitively, payoff monotonicity requires that frequencies of play reveal the ranking of
expected payoffs of all actions.
Example 1. Consider u∗ defined in Table 1. The strategy space in Γ(u∗) is a prism (Fig. 1)
and N(Γ(u∗)) is the set of profiles in which player 2 chooses b1 and player 1 arbitrarily
randomizes among her three available actions. In Fig. 1, this set corresponds to the upper
lid of the prism.
Consider a profile σ ∈ ∆(A). If σ2(b1) = 1, the expected utility of player 1 is the same for
each of her actions. Thus, only the centroid of the upper lid of the prism is payoff monotone
for u∗. Since b1 strictly dominates b2 for player 2, then in a payoff monotone distribution for
the game, σ2(b1) > 1/2. Now, suppose that σ2(b2) > 0. Then, Uu∗1(σ2, a3) > Uu∗1(σ2, a2) >
Uu∗1(σ2, a1). Thus, in a payoff monotone distribution for u
∗ in which σ2(b2) > 0, we must
have σ1(a3) > σ1(a2) > σ1(a1). Thus, the set of payoff monotone distributions for u
∗
contains, in particular, the centroid of the upper lid of the prism of strategies and the
interior of the wedge area formed by the two shaded subprisms in Fig. 1. The subset of
N(Γ(u∗)) that can be approximated by payoff monotone behavior for u∗ is the union of the
upper lids of the shaded subprisms in Fig. 1.
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Game Γ(u∗) is deceivingly simple. Trembling based refinements, for instance, predict
that the only plausible distribution of play is that Player 1 plays a3 and player 2 plays b1.
The reasoning is that since a3 weakly dominates the other actions for player 1, this agent
should preemptively play a3 in case player 2 makes a mistake. Experiments with dominant
strategy games, which generate payoff matrices similar to u∗, e.g., the second price auction,
point to the prevalence of weakly dominated behavior in these games, however (see Velez,
2019, for a meta-study). Essentially, experiments have shown is that if player 2 (types)
notices the difference in payoffs between her actions and plays b1 with high probability,
then player 1 is almost indifferent between her three actions. Since players do not seem
to react to differences in expected payoffs by not playing at all suboptimal actions, it is
plausible to observe frequencies of play in which player 2 is careful and player 1 is careless.
(For instance, in the second-price auction experiments of Kagel and Levin (1993) and Li
(2017), which hold some similarity with game Γ(u∗), dominant strategy play is consistently
below 30%.) Behavior is not arbitrary, however. Players tend to inform their choices based
on the expected payoffs (Goeree et al., 2016). Thus, one can expect that player 1 plays a3
with higher probability than a2 and a2 with higher probability than a1. If one cannot expect
further restrictions from data than those imposed by this intuition, each payoff monotone
distribution for u∗, say σ2(b1) = 0.99, σ1(a1) = 0.03, σ1(a2) = 0.35, and σ1(a3) = 0.62,
should be in the range of a theory that is well-specified to study this phenomenon.
Example 1 (continuation): The logistic QRE model, including its heterogeneous
parameter versions, does not span the whole space of payoff monotone distributions for u∗.
Indeed, no distribution such that σ1(a2) > 1/3 is in the range of this model. In particular,
no profile of strategies in the interior of the black subprism in Fig. 1 is in the range of logistic
QRE models. To prove this, let α ≡ σ1(a2) and x ≡ σ1(a1). Given the functional form
of the logistic QRF, we know that α/x = exp(λiσ1(b2)) and σ1(a3)/α = (1 − α − x)/α =
exp(2λiσ1(b2)). Thus, σ1(a3) > α
2/x and σ1(a3) + σ1(a2) + σ1(a2) > α
2/x + α + x. It is
easy to see that the minimum of (0, 1− 2α] 7→ α2/x+ α+ x is achieved at x = 1− 2α and
that this minimum is always greater than one for α > 1/3.
It is not surprising that the logistic QRE has these limitations. The logistic QRE
model is tied to very particular perturbations of payoffs. For instance, the logistic sQRF
has the property that the ratio between the probability of two actions is a function of
the difference between their expected payoffs. In our analysis of Γ(u∗), this property is
seemingly responsible for the limitations of the model.
Thus, the question that remains is whether the limitation of logistic QRE models is
simply an artifice of the form of the specific perturbations behind them or is a character-
istic of all monotone sQRE. Surprisingly, the answer is the second. These limitations are
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(a2, b1)
(a2, b2)
(a3, b2)
(a3, b1)
(a1, b1)
Figure 1: Strategies space in game Γ(u∗), i.e., ∆({a1, a2, a3}) ×∆({b1, b2}). There is a one to one corre-
spondence between the strategies space and the prism. For a given point in the prism, the probability with
which player 1 plays an action is the distance of the point to the face opposed to the vertices representing
the profiles in which the agent plays the action. The probability with which player 2 plays b1 is the distance
of the point to the lower base of the prism. For instance, the centroid of the upper lid of the prism is the
profile in which player 1 uniformly randomizes among all actions and player 2 plays b1 with probability one.
The pure strategy profile (a1, b2) corresponds to the hidden vertex on the back of the prism. The upper lid of
the prism is the set of Nash equilibria of the game. The interior of the shaded subprisms belong to the set of
payoff monotone distributions u∗ (this set also contains the centroid of the upper lid of the strategies space
and the distributions such that 1/2 > σ2(b2) > 0 and σ1(a1) = 0 < σ1(a2) < σ1(a3)). The upper lids of the
shaded subprisms are the Nash equilibria that are in the closure of weakly payoff monotone distributions for
u∗. The empirical content of any monotone structural QRE model for this game is contained in the gray
subprism. Thus, with exception of its left face, no element of the black subprism is in the range of any
monotone sQRE.
shared by all monotone sQRE (Theorem 2 below is proved by means of the analysis of a
general family of games containing Example 1). This has the far reaching consequence that
sQRE theory cannot be disciplined with M and remain well-specified for the study of this
phenomenon. Moreover, this is not tied to the number of players in our example or the
number of actions they have available, as long as at least an agent has at least three actions
available.3
Theorem 1 (The paradox of monotone sQRE). Suppose that at least an agent has at least
three actions available. Then, no set of sQRE models can be both consistent with M and
well-specified to study this phenomenon.
The limitations of the monotone sQRE models are actually starker than what Theorem 1
reveals. In some environments, one can also expect that behavior may eventually approach
mutual best responses. Thus, it may be reasonable to be interested in models that generate
3The empirical content of rQRE and sQRE for a given game is the same when all agents have at most
two actions available (Goeree et al., 2005).
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behavior in a certain proximity of the set of Nash equilibria. As Example 1 also hints, the
incompatibility persists even if one only requires that the theory be able to explain payoff
monotone behavior that is close to observable Nash equilibria: The upper lid of the black
subprism in Fig. 1 is part of N(Γ(u∗)); each of these profiles belongs to an open set (relative
to the strategies space) that is outside of the range of each monotone sQRE model, however.
Definition 3. Let M⊆ B be the set of perturbations µ for which for each u ∈ RN×A and
each σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ), (u, σ) ∈M.
Theorem 2. Suppose that at least an agent has at least three actions available. Then,
there is u ∈ RN×A for which there are σ∗ ∈ N(Γ(u)) and ε > 0 such that
1. σ∗ belongs to the closure of {σ : (u, σ) ∈M}, and
2. {σ : ||σ − σ∗|| < ε} ∩ {σ : ∃µ ∈ M, s.t. σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ)} = ∅.
We discuss the proof of Theorem 2 (this result implies Theorem 1). Our first step
is to realize that consistency of a sQRE model with payoff monotonicity is equivalent to
monotonicity of the corresponding sQRF.
Lemma 1. Let µ ∈ B. The following are equivalent.
1. For each u ∈ RN×A and each σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ), (u, σ) ∈M.
2. For each i ∈ N and each xi ∈ RAi , Q
µi
i (xi) is ordinally equivalent to xi.
Proving Theorem 2 involves constructing a utility profile that admits a Nash equilibrium
that is close to payoff monotone behavior and for which no monotone sQRE induces behavior
close to that equilibrium. In order to get intuition on how to achieve this, it is useful to
prove a much less ambitious statement. It is well known that perturbations satisfying the
following property induce behavior in M (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree et al., 2016).
This property is satisfied by i.i.d. perturbations, as in the Logistic sQRE model.
Definition 4. µ ∈ B is permutation invariant if for each i ∈ N , each permutation pi :
RAi → RAi , and each measurable C ⊆ RAi , µ(C) = µ(pi(C)).
We now show that in Example 1, no distribution in the interior of the black subprism
in Fig. 1 is in the range of any permutation invariant sQRE for this game.
Example 1 (Continuation): Suppose that σ2(b2) > 0. Thus, Uu1(σ2, a2)−Uu1(σ2, a1) <
Uu1(σ2, a3)−Uu1(σ2, a2). Let σ1 ∈ ∆(A1) be such that 0 < σ1(a1) < 1/3 < σ1(a2) < σ1(a3).
Clearly, σ1 is ordinally equivalent to Uu1(σ2, ·). We claim that there is no permutation in-
variant µ such that σ1 = Q
µ1
1
(Uu1(σ2, ·)). Even though it would not belong to B, it is enough
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Player 1
a1 a2 . . . aK−1 aK
a∗−1 5 5 . . . 5 5
A−1 \ {a
∗
−1} 1 2 . . . 2 4
Table 2: Game Γ(u) ≡ (N,A, u), N ≡ {1, ..., n}, A1 ≡ {a1, ..., aK} with K ≥ 3, and |A−1| ≥ 2. The table
shows the payoff of agent 1. Each agent j > 1 gets a payoff of 1 if she plays a∗j and zero otherwise.
to think of µ1 as the realization of a fair dice with six faces labeled by the permutations of
a vector (0, x, y) where 0 < x < y and estimate the probability that action a2 is chosen if
the perturbation is determined by the dice.4 More precisely, when the dice falls on (0, x, y)
the utility of action a1 gets a perturbation 0, the utility of action a2 gets a perturbation x,
and the utility of action a3 gets a perturbation y, and so on for the other faces of the dice.
Obviously, when the dice falls on (0, x, y) or (x, 0, y) agent 1’s maximizer is action a3. If the
dice falls on (y, 0, x), the maximizer is never a2. If action a2 is to be the maximizer with
positive probability, a2 must be the maximizer when the dice falls on (x, y, 0). There are
only two additional faces of the dice for which a2 can be the maximizer, (0, y, x) or (y, x, 0).
Suppose that a2 is the maximizer for (y, x, 0). Then, x+Uu1(σ2, a2) > y+Uu1(σ2, a1). Thus,
x + Uu1(σ2, a3) > y + Uu1(σ2, a2). This means that a2 is not the maximizer for (0, y, x).
Thus, a2 can actually be the maximizer in at most two out of six possible outcomes of the
dice roll.
This analysis reveals that permutation invariant sQRE models are closely tied to the
cardinal information in observable utilities. Indeed, these models impose restrictions on
the difference of the probability assigned to two actions based on the difference in expected
utility between these actions.
Our proof of Theorem 2 is by means of an example that extends the structure of u∗ to
general action spaces. The subtlety of our analysis, compared to the simplicity of the logistic
QRE and the permutation invariant sQRE cases, is derived from our need to establish
relationships between the outcomes of a sQRF based only on payoff monotonicity.
The game that allows us to prove Theorem 2 is defined in Table 2. In this game each
agent i 6= 1 has a strictly dominant action. The profile of these strictly dominant actions
for these agents is a∗−1. Agent 1 is indifferent among all actions if all other agents play
their strictly dominant action. Agent 1 has three different types of actions. Action a1,
which is weakly dominated by actions a2, ..., aK−1, which are all payoff equivalent. All
actions {a1, ..., aK−1} are weakly dominated by aK for this agent. The essential feature
of this game is that given any σ−1 for which σ−i(a
∗
−i) < 1, the difference in agent 1’s
4Our appendix presents a formal proof of Theorem 2 that is not based on permutation invariance. Thus,
the informality of our argument here allows us to gain intuition without entering into technicalities.
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expected payoff between actions aK and aK−1 is greater than the difference in expected
payoff between actions a2 and a1.
Lemma 2. Let Γ(u) be the game in Table 2. There is σ ∈ N(Γ(u)) that belongs to the
closure of {γ : (u, γ) ∈M} and in which each agent j 6= 1 plays the strictly dominant action
and σ1(a1) < 1/K < σ1(a2) = · · · = σ1(aK−1) < σ1(aK).
Lemma 2 states that there are (u, σ) ∈M arbitrarily close to an observable equilibrium
of Γ(u) in which agent 1 plays actions {a2, ..., aK−1} with probability greater than 1/K. The
following proposition identifies restrictions on distributions generated by monotone sQRE
models. The proof of Theorem 2 is completed by showing, based on these restrictions, that
it is impossible for these models to generate behavior close to the equilibrium identified in
Lemma 2.
Proposition 1. Let Γ(u) be the game in Table 2 and µ ∈ M. Let σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) be such
that Uui(σ−i, a1) < Uui(σ−i, a2) = · · · = Uui(σ−i, aK−1) < Uui(σ−i, aK), and Uui(σ−i, aK)−
Uui(σ−i, aK−1) > Uui(σ−i, a2)− Uui(σ−i, a1). Then, B
ui,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i) ≤ 1/K.
4 Discussion
We have shown that the sQRE theory of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) cannot be disciplined
by consistent with payoff monotonicity and remain well-specified to study this phenomenon.
As outlined in the introduction, this result points to the need to understand better
the empirical content of payoff monotone sQRE models. It is interesting, but beyond the
scope of this paper, to develop a characterization of the empirical content of payoff monotone
sQRE models. Such a characterization is the basis to determine if there is empirical support
for the restrictions, beyond payoff monotonicity, that are implicit in payoff monotone sQRE.
Alternatively, one can also reevaluate the structure of the unobservables in sQRE models
in order to construct a thory that is both consistent with M and well-specified to study this
phenomenon. In a companion paper we show that the rQRE models of Goeree et al. (2005),
and in particular a finitely parametric form of these models based on the control costs games
of van Damme (1991), essentially have these properties (Velez and Brown, 2019).5
sQRE models are closely related with Harsanyi (1973)’s randomly disturbed payoff mod-
els, which only differ in that unobservables are perturbations xi ∈ R
A that determine utility
indices a ∈ A 7→ ui(a) + xi(a).
6 Proposition 1 generalizes to this class of models, with the
5Regular QRE satisfies interiority, thus it may not generate some payoff monotone distributions in the
boundary of the strategies space.
6Note that in sQRE models perturbations for agent i are functions of agent i’s action only.
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proviso that one only requires best response functions be ordinally equivalent to payoff vec-
tors (we provide details in the Appendix). Lemma 1 does not directly generalize. Observe
that this result is a statement about QRFs, which are not well-defined in Harsanyi (1973)’s
models. We do not know if an equivalent result actually holds. Without this lemma, the
implications of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, which both hold for these models, can be
summarized as follows. If one requires best response operators to produce only behavior
that is ordinally equivalent to observed expected utility, Harsanyi (1973)’s models are not
well-specified for the study of M. Note that the first requirement in this statement is a
decision theoretical thought experiment, as opposed to the requirement of consistency with
an observable phenomenon in strategic situations as in Theorem 1. Thus, it is still an open
question whether the equivalent to Theorem 1 holds for Harsanyi (1973)’s models.
One can use randomly perturbed payoff models to refine Nash equilibrium (van Damme,
1991). Essentially, one can identify a Nash equilibrium as implausible if it cannot be ap-
proached by behavior in perturbed games. If one does not restrict perturbations, one may
be using for this exercise models that are easily rejected by data. Thus, it is sensible to
impose some discipline on perturbations. van Damme (1991) shows that if one requires per-
mutation invariance of perturbations on approximations by Harsanyi (1973)’s models, the
set of Nash equilibria that can be approximated, the “firm equilibria,” may be a strict subset
of the Nash equilibrium set. McKelvey and Palfrey (1996) alternatively propose to refine
Nash equilibria by approximation of Logistic QRE. Both of these approximations implicitly
assume payoff monotonicity. As we have shown, randomly perturbed payoff models depend
on assumptions about the structure of unobservables that are beyond consistency with pay-
off monotonicity. Thus, one can think of a better founded refinement of Nash equilibrium
by only requiring approximation by payoff monotone behavior. This is the “empirical equi-
librium” refinement of Velez and Brown (2019). Interestingly, Theorem 2 implies that there
are empirical equilibria that are neither firm, nor approachable by any structural QRE
model. Thus, both these last two refinements impose restrictions due to their particular
functional forms, which are not observable, as opposed to empirical equilibrium which is
based only on consistency with payoff monotonicity.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let µ ∈ B and u ∈ RN×A. Consider first σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ). Then,
σi = Q
µi
i (Uui(σ−i, ·)). If statement 2 is holds, then (u, σ) ∈ M. Suppose now that for each
u ∈ RN×A and each σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ) we have that (u, σ) ∈M. We claim that statement 2
holds. Suppose by contradiction that there are i ∈ N and xi ∈ R
Ai such that σi ≡ Q
µi
i (xi)
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is not ordinally equivalent with xi. Let u−i ∈ R
N\{i}×A. Consider the function
γ−i ∈ ∆−i 7→ (Q
µj
j (U
u
j (γN\{i,j}, σi, ·)))j∈N\{i} ∈ ∆−i.
This function is continuous because is the composition of structural QRFs and the expected
utility operator. Thus, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem it has a fixed point σ−i. For each
a ∈ A let ui(a) ≡ xi(ai). Then, Uui(σ−i, ·) = xi. Thus, σ = Q
µj
j (Uuj (σ−j , ·))j∈N . Thus,
σ ∈ BNE(Γ(u), µ).
Proof of Lemma 2. Clearly N(Γ(u)) is the set of distributions in which each j 6= 1 plays the
dominant action and agent 1 arbitrarily randomizes. Let σ be such that each agent j 6= 1
plays the strictly dominant action with certainty, and σ1(a1) < σ1(a2) = · · · = σ1(aK−1) <
σ1(aK). Then, σ ∈ N(Γ(u)). Let λ ∈ N and σ
λ be the convex combination that places
(1−1/λ) weight on σ and 1/λ on a uniform distribution. Clearly as λ→∞, σλ → σ. Thus,
there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ, σλ is ordinally equivalent to σ. Since for each λ ∈ N,
σλ is interior, Uui(σ
λ
−i, a1) < Uui(σ
λ
−i, a2) = · · · = Uui(σ
λ
−i, aK−1) < Uui(σ
λ
−i, aK), and for
each j 6= i, if a∗j ∈ Aj is this agent’s dominant action, Uuj (σ
λ
−j, a
∗
j ) > Uuj (σ
λ
−j , aj), and
for each pair of actions {aj , a
′
j} ⊆ Aj that are not dominant, Uuj(σ
λ
−j , aj) = Uuj (σ
λ
−j, a
′
j).
Thus, (u, σλ) ∈ M. Thus, σ belongs to the closure of {γ : (u, γ) ∈ M}. Thus, for each
1/K < α < 1/(K − 1), there is σ ∈ N(Γ(u)) that belongs to the closure of {γ : (u, γ) ∈M}
and such that 0 = σ1(a1) < α = σ1(a2) = · · · = σ1(aK−1) < (1− (K − 2)α) = σ1(aK).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let k ∈ {1, ...,K}.7 Let vk ≡ Uui(σ−i, ak) and
Xk ≡ {x ∈ R
Ai : {k} = argmaxl=1,...,Kxl}.
Let µ ∈ M. Consider u¯i ∈ R
Ai for which agent i has equal payoff from each action profile.
Since µ ∈ M, Bu¯i,µii (σ−i) = (1/K, ..., 1/K). Thus, for each k = 1, ...,K, µi(Xk) = 1/K.
Since µ ∈ B, for each measurable set G ⊆ RAi ,
µi(G) =
K∑
l=1
µi(G ∩Xk). (3)
7Proposition 1 generalizes to all of Harsanyi (1973)’s randomly disturbed payoff models for which best
response correspondences are monotone with respect to expected utlity. In order to prove this results one
can proceed as follows (see Govindan et al. (2003) for a modern presentation of this model that embeds
both sQRE and Harsanyi (1973)’s models). For each x ∈ RA, write xak ≡ (x(a−i,al))a−i∈A−i ∈ R
A
−i . Let
yk(σ−i) = σ−i · xak . Apply the argument to the sets Xk ≡ {x ∈ R
A : {k} = argmaxk=1,...,Kyk(σ−i)} and
G ≡ {x ∈ RA : {K−1} = argmaxl=1,...,K vl+yl(σ−i)}, and adjust the definitions of all sets of perturbations
to be defined by conditions on the components of y(σ−i) instead of x.
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Let G ≡ {x ∈ RAi : {K − 1} = argmaxl=1,...,K vl + xl}. Then, B
ui,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i) = µi(G). Since
v1 < v2 = · · · = vK−1 < vK ,
µi(G) = µi(G ∩X1) + µi(G ∩XK−1). (4)
Let D1 ≡ v2− v1 and D2 ≡ vK − vK−1. Consider u
′
i ∈ R
Ai for which y′ ≡ Uu′i(σ−i, ·) is such
that y′
1
= · · · = y′K−1 < y
′
K ≡ y
′
K−1 +D2 (one can simply make payoffs be independent of
the action of the other agents). Since µi ∈ M, B
u′i,µi
ia1
(σ−i) = B
u′i,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i). Moreover,
B
u′i,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i) = µi ({x ∈ XK−1 : xK−1 > xK +D2}) ,
B
u′i,µi
ia1
(σ−i) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : x1 > xK +D2}) .
Thus,
µi ({x ∈ XK−1 : xK−1 > xK +D2}) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : x1 > xK +D2}) .
Since µi ∈ Bi and µi(X1) = µi(XK−1),
µi ({x ∈ XK−1 : xK−1 < xK +D2}) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : x1 < xK +D2}) . (5)
We claim that
µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−2, xK} < xK−1})
= µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−1} < xK}) .
(6)
Consider u′′i ∈ R
Ai for which y′′ ≡ Uu′′i (σ−i, ·) is such that y
′′
1
< y′′
2
= · · · = y′′K ≡ y
′′
1
+D1.
Observe that
B
u′′i ,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−2, xK} < xK−1}) + µi(XK−1),
and
B
u′′i ,µi
iaK
(σ−i) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−1} < xK}) + µi(XK).
Since µ ∈ M, B
u′′i ,µi
iaK
(σ−i) = B
u′′i ,µi
iaK−1
(σ−i). Thus, since µi(XK−1) = µi(XK), (6) follows.
Since D2 ≥ D1, by monotonicity of measures with respect to set inclusion
µi ({x ∈ X1 : x1 < xK +D2})
≥ µi ({x ∈ X1 : x1 < xK +D1})
≥ µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−1} < xK}) .
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Replacing (5) and (6) in the first and last expressions of the inequality above yields,
µi ({x ∈ XK−1 : xK−1 < xK +D2})
≥ µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−2, xK} < xK−1}) .
Now,
µi(G ∩XK−1) = µi(XK−1)− µi ({x ∈ XK−1 : xK−1 < xK +D2}) ,
and by monotonicity of measures with respect to set inclusion,
µi(G ∩X1) = µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−2, xK +D2} < xK−1})
≤ µi ({x ∈ X1 : max{x1 −D1, x2, ..., xK−2, xK} < xK−1}) .
Thus,
µi(G ∩X1) + µi(G ∩XK−1) ≤ µi(XK−1) = 1/K.
Thus, by (4),
Bui,µiiaK−1(σ−i) = µi(G) = µi(G ∩X1) + µi(G ∩XK−1) ≤ 1/K.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Γ(u) be the game in Table 2. By Lemma 2, there is σ∗ ∈ N(Γ(u))
that belongs to the closure of {γ : (u, γ) ∈ M} in which each agent j 6= 1 plays the strictly
dominant action and σ∗
1
(a1) < 1/K < σ
∗
1
(a2) = · · · = σ
∗
1
(aK−1) < σ
∗
1
(aK). Thus, there
is ε > 0 for which for each σ ∈ ∆ such that ||σ − σ∗|| < ε, σ1(a1) < 1/K < σ1(a2).
Let σ be such that (u, σ) ∈ M and ||σ − σ∗|| < ε. Since σ1(a1) < 1/K < σ1(a2) and
(u, σ) ∈M, we have that Uui(σ−i, a1) < Uui(σ−i, a2). Thus, σ−i(a
∗
−i, a1) < 1, for otherwise
Uui(σ−i, a1) = Uui(σ−i, a2). Thus, Uui(σ−i, a2) − Uui(σ−i, a1) = (1 − σ−i(a
∗
−i, a1)) > 0 and
Uui(σ−i, aK)−Uui(σ−i, aK−1) = 2(1−σ−i(a
∗
−i, a1)). Thus, Uui(σ−i, aK)−Uui(σ−i, aK−1) >
Uui(σ−i, a2)− Uui(σ−i, a1). Thus, there is no µ ∈M such that σ ∈ (Γ(u), µ), for otherwise
by Proposition 1, σ1(a2) ≤ 1/K. Thus, {σ : ||σ − σ∗|| < ε} ∩ {σ : ∃µ ∈ M, s.t. σ ∈
BNE(Γ(u), µ)} = ∅.
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